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For decades, the relationship between the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit and patent law’s doctrine 
of inequitable conduct has resembled that between 
Shakespeare’s Prince Hal and John Falstaff. The former 
recognizes the excess, the deservedly ill repute, even the at 
least occasional wickedness of the latter, but cannot tear 
away from his close companion. Likewise, for decades, 
Federal Circuit judges have criticized the excesses of the 
defense of inequitable conduct, which can render a patent 
unenforceable as a result of misrepresentation or 
nondisclosure to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. 
Nevertheless, U.S. patent law remains wedded to the 
defense’s existence. Without a real option of repudiating 
the defense, the Federal Circuit has instead sought to guide 
and confine the defense’s application in hopes of advancing 
legitimate aims at acceptable social cost. In this effort, the 
opinion for the en banc Federal Circuit written by Chief 
Judge Randall Rader in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, 
Dickinson & Co. figures prominently. The background, 
content, and prospects for the Federal Circuit’s legal 
rulings in Therasense are the focus of this Article. 
 
                                                                                                         
* Loomer Family Professor in Law, University of Texas at Austin. For 
comments relating to an oral presentation that became the basis for this Article, I 
thank participants in the 2011 High Technology Protection Summit at University 
of Washington School of Law. 
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Why dost thou converse with that trunk of humours, 
that bolting hutch of beastliness, that swollen parcel 
of dropsies, that huge bombard of sack, that stuffed 
cloak-bag of guts, . . . that grey Iniquity . . . ? 
—Prince Hal in Henry IV, Part 11
 
 
For decades, the relationship between the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit and patent law’s doctrine of 
inequitable conduct has resembled that between Shakespeare’s 
Prince Hal and John Falstaff. The former recognizes the excess, the 
deservedly ill repute, even the at least occasional wickedness of the 
latter, but cannot tear away from his close companion. Likewise, 
for decades, Federal Circuit judges have criticized the excesses of 
the defense of inequitable conduct,2 a defense that can render a 
patent unenforceable when, in applying for the patent, the 
prospective patentee made a material misrepresentation or 
nondisclosure to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office with 
specific intent to deceive.3
                                                                                                         
1 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, 1 HENRY IV 2.5, ll. 409-414, in NORTON 
SHAKESPEARE 1187 (S. Greenblatt et al. eds., 1997). 
 In language resonant of Hal’s fusillade 
2 See David McGowan, Inequitable Conduct, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 945, 
946 & n.6 (2010) (“The Federal Circuit’s recent opinions cast the doctrine [of 
inequitable conduct] as a noxious weed”). 
3 See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co. (Therasense), 649 F.3d 
1276, 1285, 1288 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (“Inequitable conduct is an 
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of insults to Falstaff, Federal Circuit judges have variously 
characterized the inequitable conduct defense or its attendants as 
“an absolute plague,”4 “the ‘atomic bomb’ of patent law,”5 and a 
potential cause of inequity itself.6 Nevertheless, U.S. patent law 
remains wedded to the defense’s existence despite other countries’ 
demonstrated capacity to do without it.7
What can the Federal Circuit do about this unhappy marriage? 
King Henry V (formerly Prince Hal) ultimately repudiated 
Falstaff.
 
8 But absent some sort of miraculous enhancement of the 
Federal Circuit’s authority, that court is essentially powerless to 
repudiate the defense of inequitable conduct. At least some version 
of the defense is enshrined in Supreme Court precedent.9
                                                                                                         
equitable defense to patent infringement that, if proved, bars enforcement of a 
patent.”); JANICE MUELLER, PATENT LAW 348, 431 (3d ed. 2009) (“The defense 
of inequitable conduct asserts that a court should refuse to enforce a patent if it 
was procured through improper conduct before the USPTO.”); cf. Molins PLC 
v. Textron, Inc., 48 F.3d 1172, 1181 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“[C]lear and convincing 
evidence must prove that an applicant had the specific intent to . . . mislea[d] or 
deceiv[e] the PTO.”). 
 
4 Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Dayco Corp., 849 F.2d 1418, 1422 (Fed. Cir. 
1988) (“[T]he habit of charging inequitable conduct . . . has become an absolute 
plague.”); cf. Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1293 (speaking of “the way inequitable 
conduct has metastasized”). 
5 Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1288 (“[T]he remedy for inequitable conduct is 
the ‘atomic bomb’ of patent law.”) (quoting Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar 
Pharms., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting)). 
6 McKesson Info. Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Med., Inc., 487 F.3d 897, 926 
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“To avoid the inequity resulting from 
litigation-driven distortion of the complex procedures of patent prosecution, 
precedent firmly requires that the intent element of inequitable conduct must be 
established by clear and convincing evidence of deceptive intent . . . .”). 
7 MARTIN J. ADELMAN, RANDALL R. RADER & JOHN R. THOMAS, CASES 
AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW 586 (3d ed. 2009) (observing that a charge of 
inequitable conduct “is generally unavailable as an infringement defense” in 
other countries). 
8 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, 2 HENRY IV 5.5, ll. 61-62, in NORTON 
SHAKESPEARE, supra note 1, at 1374 (“I banish thee, on pain of death, [a]s I 
have done the rest of my misleaders. . . .”). 
9 See Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 
806, 819 (1945) (concluding that “inequitable conduct impregnated 
Automotive’s entire cause of action and justified dismissal”); see also 
Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1285 (“This judge-made doctrine evolved from a trio of 
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Arguably, the defense is implicit in statutory law.10
Without a real option of repudiation, the Federal Circuit has 
instead sought to guide and confine the defense’s application in 
hopes of advancing legitimate aims at acceptable social cost. In 
this effort, the opinion for the en banc Federal Circuit written by 





 figures prominently. The background, content, 
and prospects for the Federal Circuit’s legal rulings in Therasense 
are the focus of this Article.  
I. BACKGROUND TO THERASENSE 
 
A.  Reasons for a Limited Inequitable Conduct Defense 
 
It is not hard to understand why the defense of inequitable 
conduct has been characterized as “the ‘atomic bomb’ of patent 
law.”12
                                                                                                         
Supreme Court cases that applied the doctrine of unclean hands to dismiss patent 
cases involving egregious misconduct.”); 6 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON 
PATENTS § 19.03[1] (2011) (discussing cases in which the U.S. Supreme Court 
“held that fraud and inequitable conduct was a defense under the general 
equitable doctrine of clean hands.”). 
 Nor is it hard to understand why it is a difficult defense for 
10 See generally 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000) (mandating the availability of a 
defense of unenforceability “in any action involving the validity or infringement 
of a patent”). While reforming the U.S. Patent Act in 2011, Congress declined to 
abrogate the doctrine and instead limited the range of situations in which it may 
apply. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, H.R. 1249, 112th Cong. § 12(a) 
(2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 257) (enabling a patent owner to “request 
supplemental examination . . . to consider, reconsider, or correct information 
believed to be relevant to [a] patent” and thereby to inoculate a prior disclosure 
failure against a later charge of inequitable conduct); id. at § 15(a) (to be 
codified at 35 U.S.C. § 282(3)) (providing that “failure to disclose the best mode 
[of practicing a claimed invention] shall not be a basis on which any claim of a 
patent may be canceled or held invalid or otherwise unenforceable”); cf. Bilski 
v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3228 (2010) (observing that the existence of a 
statutory provision providing a special defense to infringement of a business 
method patent “further undermine[s]” an “argument that business methods are 
categorically outside of . . . [the U.S. Patent Act’s] scope”).  
11 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
12 Id. at 1288 (quoting Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., Inc., 525 
F.3d 1334, 1349 (Fed. Cir.2008) (Rader, J., dissenting)). 
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an accused infringer to resist asserting. Even when unsuccessful, 
an assertion of inequitable conduct can inflict substantial discovery 
and other litigation costs on a patentee, thereby raising the cost of 
seeking to enforce patent rights.13 The assertion can also help shift 
the moral undercurrents often implicit in litigation posturing and 
argument, with the accused infringer no longer being solely in the 
position of denying wrongdoing but also in position to accuse the 
patentee of being a wrongdoer.14 Moreover, when successful, the 
inequitable conduct defense enables an accused infringer to render 
an entire patent—perhaps even an entire set of related patents—
permanently and entirely unenforceable.15
                                                                                                         
13 See Christopher A. Cotropia, Modernizing Patent Law’s Inequitable 
Conduct Doctrine, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 723, 740 (2009) (observing that 
“litigation of inequitable conduct claims is particularly costly,” in part because 
“deposition of the prosecuting attorney who handled the application is almost 
always necessary,” and such a deposition implicates “complex attorney-client 
privilege issues”); see also Randall R. Rader, A Review of Recent Decisions of 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Foreward: Always at 
the Margin: Inequitable Conduct in Flux, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 777, 783 (2010) 
(“An allegation of inequitable conduct open[s] the door to vast discovery into 
the circumstances of the patent prosecution . . . .”). 
 The accused infringer 
14 See Christian Mammen, Revisiting the Doctrine of Inequitable Conduct 
Before the Patent and Trademark Office, 21 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & 
ENT. L.J. 1007, 1009 (2011) (“Inequitable conduct is also a popular defense 
because of the litigation narrative it provides.”); cf. David O. Taylor, Patent 
Fraud, 83 TEMPLE L. REV. 49, 65 (2010) (stating that “[a]llegations of 
inequitable conduct also may affect juries’ and courts’ views of the merits of 
other issues in patent infringement lawsuits, primarily infringement and 
validity” and allegations “have a negative impact on the reputations of inventors 
and patent attorneys accused of wrongdoing”). See generally CHISUM, supra 
note 9, at § 19.03[6] (listing, as potential consequences of “proof of fraud or 
inequitable conduct,” “liability for damages under the antitrust laws,” “liability 
under the Federal Trade Commission Act,” “liability under the federal securities 
laws,” and “disciplinary action against an attorney or agent who is registered to 
practice before the Patent and Trademark Office”). 
15 Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1288 (“Unlike validity defenses, which are claim 
specific, inequitable conduct regarding any single claim renders the entire patent 
unenforceable . . . . Moreover, the taint of a finding of inequitable conduct can 
spread from a single patent to render unenforceable other related patents and 
applications in the same technology family.”) (citations omitted). In contrast, an 
invalidity defense, such as an assertion that patent claims are invalid for lack of 
novelty, ordinarily proceeds on a comparatively plodding claim-by-claim basis. 
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might also be able to recover attorney fees16 or to pursue an 
antitrust claim against the patentee.17
Should U.S. patent law rid itself of an infringement defense 
based on inequitable conduct? Should concerns with inequitable 
conduct instead be addressed separately through professional 
discipline or regulation of future relations between a patentee and 
the USPTO? These points can be argued,
 Thus, in multiple ways, the 
inequitable conduct defense is a way of turning the tables and 
taking the “offensive” against a patentee. 
18
                                                                                                         
See 35 U.S.C. § 282 (“Each claim of a patent . . . shall be presumed valid 
independently of the validity of other claims . . . . ”); 800 Adept, Inc. v. Murex 
Sec., Ltd., 539 F.3d 1354, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Under the patent statute, the 
validity of each claim must be considered separately.”). Hence, just because one 
claim is invalid does not necessarily imply that another claim is, but if a patent 
applicant has committed inequitable conduct in relation to even just one claim in 
a patent application, the entire patent might be rendered unenforceable. 
 but as Part I suggests, 
even aside from Federal Circuit precedent, both Supreme Court 
precedent and congressional action or inaction indicate that the 
United States will have a substantial inequitable conduct defense  
 
 
16 Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1289 (“[P]revailing on a claim of inequitable 
conduct often makes a case ‘exceptional,’ leading potentially to an award of 
attorneys’ fees . . . .”); CHISUM, supra note 9, at § 19.03[6] (listing “an award of 
attorney’s fees” as a potential consequence of “proof of fraud or inequitable 
conduct”). 
17 Id. (“A finding of inequitable conduct may also spawn antitrust and unfair 
competition claims.”); CHISUM, supra note 9, at § 19.03[6] (listing “liability for 
damages under the antitrust laws” as a potential consequence of “proof of fraud 
or inequitable conduct”). 
18 See, e.g., NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, A PATENT SYSTEM FOR THE 
21ST CENTURY 123 (2004) (“In view of its cost and limited deterrent value the 
committee recommends the elimination of the inequitable conduct doctrine or 
changes in its implementation.”); Cotropia, supra note 13, at 728 (“This 
Article’s main finding is that the inequitable conduct doctrine has the ability to 
improve patent quality as long as the inherent tendency to overcomply with the 
doctrine by overloading the USPTO with information is kept in check.”); cf. 
Lisa A. Dolak, The Inequitable Conduct Gyre Widens, 50 IDEA 215, 215 (2010) 
(“On several occasions of late, I have been unable to resist the temptation to 
introduce my remarks relating to . . . the doctrine of inequitable conduct with a 
warning to the patent practitioners in the audience: ‘Get out! Get out while you 
still can!’”). 
6
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 7, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol7/iss4/5
2012] PATENT LAW’S FALSTAFF: INEQUITABLE CONDUCT,  359 
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, AND THERASENSE 
  
for the foreseeable future and thus that the debate is largely 
academic.19
In any event, retention of even a flawed inequitable conduct 
defense is not necessarily a bad thing. Reliance on inequitable 
conduct as a potentially powerful counterpunch to a suit of 
infringement might plausibly be viewed as an important and even 
critical part of the complicated system of checks and balances that 
constitutes U.S. patent law. There is reasonable cause to believe 
that an inequitable conduct defense can help correct for a 
combination of limitations of that system, including: 
 
(1) The USPTO’s limited ability to check for 
deception or, more generally, to conduct thorough 
reviews of all material potentially relevant to a 
particular patent application’s allowability;20
(2) The substantial incentive for deception that an 




(3) The likely lack, even after relevant aspects of 
the recent patent reform act become effective, of 
administrative procedures to challenge the validity 
of another’s issued or contemplated patent rights 
that are as robust as those found in other leading  
 
 
 and  
                                                                                                         
19 See supra text accompanying notes 9-11. 
20 See Cotropia, supra note 13, at 753-54 (observing that patent examiners 
generally “do not have ready access to all technical literature” or other forms of 
prior art such as “offers to s[ell], conference presentations, test data, and product 
brochures”); id. at 756 (observing that “examiners do not have the time[,  
resources, or training] to independently verify all of an applicant’s statements 
and claims”). 
21 Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2244 (2011) (rejecting 
contentions that proof of patent claim invalidity requires only “a preponderance 
of the evidence”). 
22 See Taylor, supra note 14, at 86 (“Reducing the standard of proving 
invalidity for undisclosed or unconsidered material prior art would encourage 
compliance with the duty of disclosure . . . .”). 
7
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patent jurisdictions, such as Japan and the European 
Union.23
As long as these three features of the U.S. patent system remain, 
courts and policymakers might correctly believe that an inequitable 
conduct defense able to be asserted by private parties is a 
necessary measure to curtail opportunistic or abusive behavior in 
dealings with the USPTO.
  
24
In short, the existence of an inequitable conduct defense can 
generate significant systemic benefits, but the defense has proven 
to be difficult to manage and also to generate significant systemic 
costs. How then should the Federal Circuit seek to regulate the 
defense’s use? In principle, the court could take a relatively hands-
off approach, leaving the doctrine’s application as a matter of 
minimally guided equitable discretion, and giving district court 
judges relatively free rein to apply the doctrine in individual cases. 
But given the severe sanction of unenforceability currently 
associated with inequitable conduct as a matter of course, such an 
approach would seem to leave the defense’s application intolerably 
unpredictable, raising the resulting systemic costs and defeating 
part of Congress’s apparent purpose in promoting national 
uniformity and predictability in patent litigation through creation 
of a centralized court of appeals for patent infringement suits.
 
25
                                                                                                         
23 See Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Patent Law’s Inequitable 
Conduct Doctrine, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 735, 778 (2011) (suggesting that “the social 
benefits of an inequitable conduct doctrine are likely to be greater in a system 
like the United States’ in which opportunities for post-grant oppositions are 
constrained”).  
 
The Federal Circuit thus seems properly charged with trying to 
24 See Jason Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge, Toward a System of Invention 
Registration: The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST 
IMPRESSIONS 24, 30 (2011) (describing the inequitable conduct defense as “[t]he 
clearest tool of pre-[America Invents Act] patent law to discourage” a strategy 
of nondisclosure of relevant information to the USPTO). 
25 Daniel J. Meador, Retrospective on the Federal Circuit: The First 20 
Years—A Historical View, 11 FED. CIR. B.J. 557, 558 (2002) (discussing how 
interest in “enhanc[ing] national uniformity in federal decisional law” helped 
lead to creation of the Federal Circuit); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal 
Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 7 (1989) 
(observing how substantial divergence in how regional circuits applied federal 
patent law became a justification for creation of the Federal Circuit). 
8
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 7, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol7/iss4/5
2012] PATENT LAW’S FALSTAFF: INEQUITABLE CONDUCT,  361 
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, AND THERASENSE 
  
hammer out doctrinal contours for an inequitable conduct defense 
that is both substantial and limited, an effective deterrent for 
prospective patentees and remedy for accused infringers that 
avoids becoming too much of a vehicle for opportunistic and 
abusive behavior itself.  
This last task of confining the inequitable conduct doctrine 
within sensible bounds is perhaps particularly hard because the 
United States’ federal courts, by constitutional command, do not 
work in a vacuum; they cannot focus on defining Platonic ideals or 
even tracing shadows on walls. The meaning and application of 
judge-made law is hammered out in adversarial litigation, in which 
each side can be expected to seek to push—indeed to distend—
favorable doctrines as far as possible and necessary to suit their 
clients’ ends. As a result, as Chief Judge Rader himself has 
observed, a doctrine like that of inequitable conduct has a natural 
tendency to become bloated as one and then another defendant 
tries to establish this most desirable defense under questionably 
clear sets of facts.26 The courts might succeed in filtering out most 
improper claims of inequitable conduct, but the fallibility or 
different perspectives of Article III judges27 mean that, at some 
point, one or another of the weaker claims for inequitable conduct 
is likely to have its day.28
                                                                                                         
26 See Rader, supra note 13, at 780 (2010) (“A cursory examination of the 
development of inequitable conduct law . . . lends support to the notion that this 
doctrine is constantly overflowing its banks.”). 
 The success of this claim will then 
become a precedent that later accused infringers will cite, and there 
is potential for an amplified unraveling of the doctrinal constraints 
that are meant to keep both the doctrine’s application and its 
invocation within reasonable bounds. The resulting bloat of patent 
law’s Falstaff will have again overcome any pretense of restraint. 
27 Cf. Lee Petherbridge, Jason Rantanen & Ali Mojibi, The Federal Circuit 
and Inequitable Conduct: An Empirical Assessment, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1293, 
1351 (2011) (suggesting that Federal Circuit standards for inequitable conduct 
might be difficult to enforce because “judges’ decisions on inequitable conduct 
are impacted by their moral views of right and wrong”). 
28 Cf. Rader, supra note 13, at 785 (observing that “litigants continually 
solicit courts to rewrite or modify the law to suit their particular needs” and 
courts “sometimes oblige without adequate attention to the full consequences”). 
9
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What can the Federal Circuit do about the inequitable conduct 
defense’s seemingly natural tendency toward bloat? One can 
imagine at least two nonexclusive responses: (1) limiting the 
defense’s application by, for example, tightening the requirements 
for pleading the defense or for proving its elements; (2) limiting or 
diluting the defense’s effects by, for example, enabling district 
courts to provide remedies other than complete patent 
unenforceability.29 The Federal Circuit has pursued the first 
course.30
 
 The remainder of this Article will explore how this 
pursuit has led up to and been embodied in the opinion for the en 
banc court in Therasense. 
B.  Precursors to Therasense 
 
Whatever the validity of concerns that Federal Circuit judges 
lack sufficient exposure to economics or non-patent-based thinking 
to have substantial responsibility for the development of 
innovation-oriented law or policy,31
                                                                                                         
29 See Cotropia, supra note 
 among members of the federal 
13, at 774-75 (proposing various ways to 
mollify the consequences of an inequitable conduct finding); Taylor, supra note 
14, at 85 (“One possible reform is to return judicial discretion to the application 
of remedies for findings of inequitable conduct.”). 
30 The opinion for the en banc Federal Circuit in Therasense contains at 
least a hint at the possibility of pursuing the second course in its statement that 
“the unclean hands doctrine remains available to supply a remedy for egregious 
misconduct.” 649 F.3d at 1287. Consistent with this statement, “egregious 
misconduct” might provide a basis for equitable relief distinct from complete 
patent unenforceability in situations where the “egregious misconduct” does not 
fit the category of “affirmative egregious misconduct” that constitutes 
inequitable conduct. Id. at 1292. 
31 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The Federal Circuit: A Continuing 
Experiment in Specialization, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 769, 782 (2004) (noting 
critics’ contention that Federal Circuit suffers from “a failure to properly 
consider the interaction between the rules the court articulates and innovation 
policy”); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A Multi-Institutional 
Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1106-07 (2003) 
(criticizing a Federal Circuit decision for “ignor[ing] the economic reality . . . 
that patents are not generally necessary as a mechanism for promoting 
innovation in the area of business methods”); cf. Paul R. Gugliuzza, Patent 
Law’s Uniformity Principle and the Consequences of Judicial Specialization, 
100 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming 2012) (suggesting that Federal Circuit adjudication 
 
10
Washington Journal of Law, Technology & Arts, Vol. 7, Iss. 4 [2012], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wjlta/vol7/iss4/5
2012] PATENT LAW’S FALSTAFF: INEQUITABLE CONDUCT,  363 
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT, AND THERASENSE 
  
judiciary they are unusually well placed to understand how patent 
law’s various constituencies are affected by the defense of 
inequitable conduct, a defense that focuses peculiarly on details of 
patent law practice. Concentration of patent appeals in the Federal 
Circuit ensures that each Federal Circuit judge consumes a steady 
diet of patent cases each year.32
 Moreover, Federal Circuit judges gather information about 
problems with the practice of patent law through other channels. 
As part of an apparent effort to stay in touch with relevant patent 
communities, Federal Circuit judges regularly participate in patent-
law-related conferences, speak at events organized by law schools 
or bar associations, compare notes with U.S. trial judges and 
judges from other jurisdictions, and make written contributions to 
law reviews or bar journals. Indeed, the Federal Circuit’s Chief 
Judge Randall Rader—a casebook co-author,
 If there is a “plague” of difficult-
to-resolve charges of inequitable conduct, Federal Circuit judges 
are, ex officio, likely to know about it. 
33 regular teacher at 
law schools,34 occasional trial judge,35
One can debate whether, generally speaking, Federal Circuit 
 and seemingly tireless 
traveler to conferences, both domestic and foreign—embodies this 
dedication to engagement with relevant patent communities at a 
level of intensity that is virtually exhausting to describe. 
                                                                                                         
could improve if the court had a broader docket of economically oriented cases). 
32 Cf. John M. Golden, The Supreme Court as “Prime Percolator”: A 
Prescription for Appellate Review of Questions in Patent Law, 56 UCLA L. 
REV. 657, 667 (2009) (observing in 2009 that “the typical Federal Circuit judge 
has participated in deciding several hundred patent cases on the merits”). 
33 See ADELMAN, supra note 7. 
34 GW Law – Faculty Directory, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY 
(last visited May 15, 2012), http://www.law.gwu.edu/Faculty/ 
profile.aspx?id=3258 (describing “Professorial Lecturer in Law” Randall R. 
Rader as having “taught courses . . . at The George Washington University Law 
School, University of Virginia School of Law, Georgetown University Law 
Center, the Munich Intellectual Property Law Center, and other university 
programs in Tokyo, Taipei, New Delhi, and Beijing”). 
35 See, e.g., PA Advisors, LLC v. Google, Inc., 706 F. Supp. 2d 739 (E.D. 
Tex. 2010) (Rader, J.); IP Innovation L.L.C. v. Red Hat, Inc., 705 F. Supp. 2d 
692 (E.D. Tex. 2010) (Rader, J.); Performance Pricing, Inc. v. Google Inc., 704 
F. Supp. 2d 577 (E.D. Tex. 2010) (Rader, J.); Cornell Univ. v. Hewlett-Packard 
Co., 654 F. Supp. 2d 119 (N.D.N.Y. 2009) (Rader, J.). 
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judges succeed through their extra-judicial activities in exposing 
themselves to the “right” cross section of persons interested in how 
the U.S. patent system or, more generally, the U.S. innovation 
ecosystem operates. There has long been concern that the benefits 
of engagement-based expertise such as that indicated above can be 
counterbalanced by the detriments of engagement-based 
“capture.”36 But such concern seems substantially less salient with 
respect to inequitable conduct, an issue that parties regularly and 
heatedly contest before the Federal Circuit and within the 
communities with which Federal Circuit judges otherwise 
regularly interact.37
Of course, merely being in position to recognize problems with 
the inequitable conduct defense does not ensure success in shaping 
the defense’s doctrinal development. In light of the defense’s 
tendency toward bloat, such success likely requires constant work. 
Often, this work will occur through majority opinions, as was 
ultimately the case in the 2011 opinion by Chief Judge Rader for 
the en banc court in Therasense. Even before Therasense, 
however, the 2008 opinion for a Federal Circuit panel in Star 
Scientific, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
 
38 with then-Chief 
Judge Michel writing, emphasized “[t]he need to strictly enforce 
the burden of proof and elevated standard of proof” for inequitable 
conduct and articulated the requirement that an inference of 
deceptive intent must “be the single most reasonable inference able 
to be drawn from the evidence.”39 Likewise, the 2009 opinion for a 
Federal Circuit panel in Exergen Corp. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,40
                                                                                                         
36 See John M. Golden, Patentable Subject Matter and Institutional Choice, 
89 TEX. L. REV. 1041, 1099 (2011) (observing that “concerns of capture and 
bias are normal in administrative law,” but that “[a] number of commentators 
suggest that such concerns have been systematically exaggerated”); cf. Rai, 
supra note 
 
31, at 1110 (“Because capture is an obvious alternate explanation for 
the [Federal Circuit]’s jurisprudence, it is important to evaluate carefully . . . this 
hypothesis.”). 
37 Cf. Golden, supra note 32, at 683 (observing that, in circumstances 
involving “relative balance in advocacy,” “there seems, at first blush at least, 
little basis for picking out a single systematic direction for capture to take”). 
38 537 F.3d 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2008). 
39 Id. at 1365-66. 
40 575 F.3d 1312 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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penned by Judge Linn, operated to limit application of the defense 
by embracing a relatively demanding view of pleading 
requirements under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b).41
But significant groundwork for the Federal Circuit’s retuning 
of inequitable conduct doctrine in Therasense was also laid 
through a series of separate, non-majority opinions.
  
42 In a 2007 
dissent in McKesson Information Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Medical, 
Inc.,43 Judge Pauline Newman complained that standards for what 
constituted inequitable conduct had slipped to the point of 
encouraging a new “‘plague’ of . . . unwarranted charges,”44 and 
she warned that the majority’s approach risked making routine “the 
inequity [of patent unenforceability] resulting from litigation-
driven distortion of the complex procedures of patent 
prosecution.”45 Almost exactly one year later, then-Judge Rader 
added a dissent of his own, arguing that holdings of inequitable 
conduct should be restricted to “extreme cases of fraud and 
deception”46
                                                                                                         
41 Id. at 1328-29 (“[A]lthough ‘knowledge’ and ‘intent’ may be averred 
generally, a pleading of inequitable conduct under Rule 9(b) must include 
sufficient allegations of underlying facts from which a court may reasonably 
infer that a specific individual (1) knew of the withheld material information or 
of the falsity of the material misrepresentation, and (2) withheld or 
misrepresented this information with a specific intent to deceive the PTO.”); see 
also Taylor, supra note 
 and echoing Judge Newman’s concerns about 
14, at 72 (“Exergen may represent the first foray into the 
adoption of principles from the law of fraud into the law of inequitable 
conduct.”). 
42 The sequence of separate opinions and suggestive panel opinions leading 
up to the en banc court’s decision in Therasense illustrates how even this single 
appellate court can act as a “percolator” for new ideas and approaches despite 
the normally ossifying effect of circuit precedent. See Lee Petherbridge, Patent 
Law Uniformity?, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 421, 428 (2009) (“The presence of 
large numbers of written opinions with significantly different outcomes suggests 
that Federal Circuit decisions in the area of law studied are not characterized by 
irretrievably entrenched broad-rule precedents.”). But cf. Craig Allen Nard & 
John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1619, 1646 (2007) (observing that “intracircuit percolation does not escape 
the constraining force of precedent”). 
43 487 F.3d 897 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
44 Id. at 926 (Newman, J., dissenting). 
45 Id. 
46 Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharms., Inc., 525 F.3d 1334, 1349 
 
13
Golden: Patent Law's Falstaff: Inequitable Conduct, the Federal Circuit,
Published by UW Law Digital Commons, 2012
366 WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS  [VOL. 7:4 
inequitable abuse of this equitable defense by observing that the 
defense had “taken on a new life as a litigation tactic.”47 Judge 
Richard Linn added his own significant separate opinions on 
inequitable conduct both before and after his opinion for a Federal 
Circuit panel in Exergen. In a 2009 concurring opinion, he 
lamented that Federal Circuit precedent had come to “perpetuat[e] 
what was once referred to as a ‘plague.’”48 In 2010, Judge Linn 
wrote a lengthy dissent from a decision by a three-judge panel in 
the Therasense case itself.49
Such majority and non-majority opinions are only a sampling 
of the pushing and pulling, the expressions of dissatisfaction, and 
the implicit invitations of attorney challenges to the status quo that 
led up to the en banc court’s holdings in Therasense. After the 
Federal Circuit signaled interest in a wholesale reevaluation of the 
inequitable conduct doctrine in its grant of en banc review,
 
50 Chief 
Judge Rader used a concurring opinion to deliver a further shot 
across the bow by describing Therasense as intended “to address 
the transformation of inequitable conduct from the rare exceptional 
cases of egregious fraud that results in the grant of a patent . . . to a 
rather automatic assertion in every infringement case.”51
Moreover, communications by Federal Circuit judges came 
through mechanisms other than judicial opinions. Earlier in the 




                                                                                                         
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting). 
 an issue of the American University Law Review 
featured a foreword by Chief Judge Rader suggesting that “the 
47 Id. 
48 Larson Mfg. Co. of S.D., Inc. v. Aluminart Prods. Ltd., 559 F.3d 1317, 
1342 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Linn, J., concurring). 
49 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co. (Therasense III), 593 F.3d 
1289, 1312-25 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Linn, J., dissenting), vacated, 374 Fed. Appx. 
35 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
50 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co. (Therasense IV), 374 Fed. 
Appx. 35, 35-36 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (listing various questions to be 
addressed in “new briefs”). 
51 Advanced Magnetic Closures, Inc. v. Rome Fastener Corp., 607 F.3d 817, 
835 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Rader, J., concurring). 
52 Therasense IV, 374 Fed. Appx. at 35 (granting en banc review on April 
26, 2010). 
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Federal Circuit’s inequitable conduct jurisprudence might profit 
from a renewed focus on propounding clear standards that can be 
easily applied by lower courts and the public.”53
Thus, the Federal Circuit made its way to the threshold of 
reformulation of inequitable conduct doctrine in Therasense. Part 
II looks at what the court did upon crossing. 
  
 
II. DOCTRINAL RETRENCHMENT IN THERASENSE 
 
A.  Therasense Facts 
 
The basic facts relevant to the inequitable conduct charge in 
Therasense help to put the Federal Circuit’s rulings in context and 
can be described as follows. Abbott Laboratories and its subsidiary 
Therasense, Inc. (hereinafter collectively referred to as “Abbott”) 
sued Becton, Dickinson & Co. for infringement of U.S. Patent No. 
5,820,551 (“the ’551 patent”).54 The ’551 patent contains claims 
directed to “disposable blood glucose test strips for diabetes 
management.”55 The ’551 patent specifically claims a form of test 
strip that tests the glucose concentration level in “whole blood”—
i.e., “blood that contains all of its components, including red blood 
cells.”56 As described in the patent’s sole independent claim, the 
form of test strip claimed uses an “active electrode . . . configured 
to be exposed to said whole blood sample without an intervening 
membrane or other whole blood filtering member.”57
The ’551 patent issued after a contentious, more than fourteen-
year prosecution history that featured no fewer than six 
continuations or continuations-in-part of abandoned applications.
  
58
                                                                                                         
53 Rader, supra note 13, at 785. 
 
54 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co. (Therasense II), 565 F. 
Supp. 2d 1088, 1091 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (describing procedural history), aff’d in 
part and vacated in part, 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc). 
55 Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co. (Therasense), 649 F.3d 
1276, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc).  
56 Id. at 1283. 
57 U.S. Patent No. 5,820,551 col.14 ll. 1-3 (issued Oct. 13, 1998). 
58 See id. (showing “Related U.S. Application Data” on patent’s cover 
page); see also Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1283 (“Over thirteen years, that original 
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Abbott was not the original owner of rights in what ultimately 
became the ’551 patent. About a dozen years into the ’551 patent’s 
prosecution history, Abbott acquired Medisense, Inc., the company 
owning rights in the ’551-related applications.59 A patent attorney 
at Abbott, Lawrence Pope, then took over prosecution of the ’551 
application and submitted new claim language that included the 
requirement for a sensor “that did not require a protective 
membrane for whole blood.”60 With a supporting affidavit from 
Abbott’s Director of Research and Development, Dr. Gordon 
Sanghera, Pope argued that this claim limitation distinguished the 
claimed invention from disclosures in a prior-art patent also 
acquired from Medisense, U.S. Patent No. 4,545,382 (“the ’382 
patent”).61
The tricky point in Abbott’s argument was that the ’382 patent 
describes “a protective membrane” for a glucose sensor that is 
present “[o]ptionally, but preferably when being used on live 
blood.”
  
62 At least to a layperson, the plain language of this 
statement might suggest that the ’382 patent discloses that use of a 
“protective membrane” for purposes like that associated with the 
claims of the ’551 patent was already recognized as merely 
“optiona[l]” and therefore not required. But Dr. Sanghera’s 
affidavit contended that, upon reading the ’382 patent, a person 
skilled in the relevant technological art—the relevant person for 
legal purposes—“would have felt that an active electrode 
comprising an enzyme and a mediator would require a protective 
membrane if it were to be used with a whole blood sample.”63 
Consistent with this understanding, the skilled artisan “would not 
read [the ’382 patent’s ‘optionally, but preferably’ language] to 
teach that the use of a protective membrane with a whole blood 
sample is optionally or merely preferred.”64
                                                                                                         
application saw multiple rejections for anticipation and obviousness, including 
repeated rejections over . . . another patent owned by Abbott.”). 
 Attorney Pope 
59 Therasense II, 565 F. Supp. 2d at 1093. 
60 Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1283. 
61 Id. (describing the affidavit and accompanying attorney argument). 
62 U.S. Patent No. 4,545,382 col.4 ll. 63-65 (issued Oct. 8, 1985). 
63 Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1283 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
64 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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similarly argued that the “optionally, but preferably” language was 
“mere patent phraseology” and that a skilled artisan “would not 
have read [the ’382 patent] as teaching that the use of a protective 
membrane with whole blood samples was optional.”65 Despite the 
’382 patent’s plain language, the contentions of Pope and Sanghera 
were apparently convincing. In the wake of these representations, 
the USPTO examiner “finally approved the proposed claims.”66
Something the examiner was not told was that, in appealing 
revocation of the European counterpart of the ’382 patent in 1995, 
Medisense had argued to the European Patent Office (EPO) that 
the sentence featuring the “[o]ptionally, but preferably” language 
was “unequivocally clear”: “The protective membrane is 
optional[;] however, it is preferred when used on live blood . . . . 
[T]he sensor electrode as claimed does not have (and must not 
have) a semipermeable membrane in the sense of [another prior-art 
reference].”
 
67 Given that Pope and Sanghera had needed to counter 
the ’382 patent’s plain language with an affidavit about the 
particular meaning that an ordinary artisan would attach to that 
language, one might have expected them to recognize that an 
examiner or, perhaps more to the point, a court would be interested 
in prior statements asserting that the language was “unequivocally 
clear.” As a matter of best practice, one might have thought they 
should disclose those statements to the USPTO even if they 
believed them reconcilable with their current contentions because 
of differences in context, etc. But, although both attorney Pope and 
Dr. Sanghera knew of these prior statements by Abbott’s 
predecessor in interest, they concededly “made a conscious and 
deliberate decision to withhold disclosure” of them to the 
USPTO.68
At trial, Abbott argued that the nondisclosure was immaterial,
  
69
                                                                                                         
65 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 
and attorney Pope and Dr. Sanghera testified that they lacked 
66 Therasense II, 565 F. Supp. 2d at 1094. 
67 Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1284 (emphasis omitted). 
68 Therasense II, 565 F. Supp. 2d at 1107-08. 
69 See id. at 1112 (discussing arguments that the nondisclosure was 
immaterial). 
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deceptive intent.70 A key assertion was that the statements from the 
EPO prosecution focused on distinguishing a “diffusion-limiting 
membrane” and thus were properly viewed as irrelevant to 
distinction of “blood separation membranes and filters”—
“completely separate pieces of technology” according to Dr. 
Sanghera.71 The district court disagreed and held that the 
nondisclosure was “highly material,”72 that neither attorney Pope 
nor Dr. Sanghera had any “plausible reason” for their 
nondisclosure, and that both acted with intent to deceive.73 Before 
the Federal Circuit’s review of the case en banc, a divided Federal 
Circuit panel affirmed the district court, holding that the district 
court did not clearly err in its factual findings of materiality74 and 
intent,75 and “did not abuse its discretion in holding the ’551 patent 
unenforceable due to inequitable conduct.”76
 
 
B.  New Rules for Intent and Materiality 
 
If the en banc Federal Circuit had focused on resolving whether 
inequitable conduct had occurred under the particular facts of 
Therasense, there seems a good chance that the division of opinion 
                                                                                                         
70 Id. at 1113-16 (discussing contentions of lack of deceptive intent). 
71 Id. at 1116 (quoting Dr. Sanghera’s testimony) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
72 Id. at 1110. 
73 See id. at 1113 (“Sadly, this order must find that Attorney Pope had no 
plausible reason for consciously withholding the EPO submissions and that he 
acted with specific intent to deceive Examiner Shay and the PTO.”); id. at 1116 
(“Taking into account all possible inferences of good faith, this order concludes 
that Dr. Gordon Sanghera had no plausible reason for concealing the 
inconsistent EPO submissions and that he consciously made sworn statements to 
the [USPTO] that were deliberately misleading . . . .”). 
74 Therasense III, 593 F.3d at 1305 (“The district court’s finding that the 
EPO statements were highly material because they contradicted the position 
taken before the PTO was not clearly erroneous and was strongly supported by 
the uncontradicted record.”). 
75 Id. at 1308 (concluding that “the district court was clearly correct in 
concluding that the explanations offered by Pope and Dr. Sanghera were not 
plausible” and that, “[a]ccordingly, the district court did not clearly err in 
finding that Pope and Dr. Sanghera both intended to deceive the PTO by 
withholding the EPO documents”). 
76 Id. 
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evident at the panel stage might have dominated the opinions 
issued after the rehearing en banc. As in many cases where 
inequitable conduct is charged, there was a nondisclosure that 
reasonable people might view as, at the very least, suspiciously 
contrary to principles of best practice, most specifically the norm 
of erring on the side of disclosure to the USPTO.77 Add to the 
violation of such norms the possibility of different understandings 
of the context-specific significance of the nondisclosure and the 
likelihood of decision-makers having different priors about the 
probability of deceptive intent when nondisclosure or 
misrepresentation occurs.78
In this context, the en banc Federal Circuit appears properly to 
have focused on providing general prescriptions for adjudication of 
inequitable conduct charges while leaving for the district court the 
task of reconsidering the specific question of how the defense 
should apply to Therasense’s particular facts.
 The result is a situation in which 
outcomes of the adjudication of inequitable conduct charges is 
likely to be highly unpredictable, thus raising various concerns 
about arbitrariness and unfairness in adjudication, potential 
litigation abuse, and incentives for wasteful and possibly 
distracting overdisclosure to the USPTO.  
79
                                                                                                         
77 See Therasense III, 593 F.3d at 1305 (“[I]f this could be regarded as a 
close case, which it is not, we have repeatedly emphasized that the duty of 
disclosure requires that the material in question be submitted to the examiner 
rather than withheld by the applicant.”). See generally U.S. PATENT & 
TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2004, at 
2000-10 (rev. 8th ed. 2010) (“When in doubt, it is desirable and safest to submit 
information. . . . [T]he question of relevancy in close cases[] should be left to the 
examiner and not the applicant.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); 
Therasense III, 593 F.3d at 1319 (Linn, J., dissenting) (describing “the familiar 
adage that ‘[c]lose cases should be resolved by disclosure’” as “sage advice” 
that “practitioners should take . . . to heart” (citation and emphasis omitted)). 
 The general 
prescriptions provided give the law a significant, non-fact-specific 
78 Such priors might be personalized because they reflect personal 
experience, relatively individualized understandings of human nature, or 
relatively individualized understandings of the care and precision with respect to 
which people can be expected to act during patent prosecution. 
79 Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1296 (“[T]his court vacates the district court’s 
finding of inequitable conduct and remands for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion.”). 
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shove toward a leaner doctrine of inequitable conduct. And 
interestingly, in light of criticism of the Federal Circuit for being 
overly formalist and inattentive to policy concerns,80
Left unfettered, the inequitable conduct doctrine has 
plagued not only the courts but also the entire patent 
system. Because allegations of inequitable conduct 
are routinely brought on the slenderest grounds, 
patent prosecutors constantly confront the specter of 
inequitable conduct charges. With inequitable 
conduct casting the shadow of a hangman’s noose, 
it is unsurprising that patent prosecutors regularly 
bury PTO examiners with a deluge of prior art 
references, most of which have marginal value. . . . 
 the Federal 
Circuit explicitly tied this doctrinal shove to the court’s assessment 
of the public interest. The majority opinion by Chief Judge Rader 
explained: 
While honesty at the PTO is essential, low 
standards for intent and materiality have 
inadvertently led to many unintended consequences, 
among them, increased adjudication cost and 
complexity, reduced likelihood of settlement, 
burdened courts, strained PTO resources, increased 
PTO backlog, and impaired patent quality. This 
court now tightens the standards for finding both 
intent and materiality in order to redirect a doctrine 
that has been overused to the detriment of the 
public.81
                                                                                                         
80 See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, In Search of Institutional Identity: 
The Federal Circuit Comes of Age, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 787, 791 (2008) 
(discussing criticism of the Federal Circuit for “[f]ormalistic case-parsing, 
refusals to consider policy arguments, and reluctance to revise positions once 
taken”); Rai, supra note 
 
31, at 1102-04 (arguing that “rule-formalism that is 
opaque to policy considerations . . . is a poor fit for [the U.S.] patent statute,” but 
that, “[i]n several major areas of patent law decisionmaking . . . the Federal 
Circuit’s approach . . . has been decidedly formalist”). 
81 Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1289-90 (internal quotation marks and citations 
omitted); cf. id. at 1302 (Bryson, J., dissenting) (“There is broad consensus that 
the law of inequitable conduct is in an unsatisfactory state and needs 
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Tightening of the law’s intent requirement came about as 
follows. First, the court’s eleven “active” judges82 unanimously 
reaffirmed that proof of inequitable conduct requires clear and 
convincing evidence of “specific intent to deceive” and that “gross 
negligence or negligence under a ‘should have known’ standard 
does not satisfy this intent requirement.”83 Second, the Federal 
Circuit judges unanimously overruled circuit precedent84 by 
holding that “court[s] should not use a ‘sliding scale,’ where a 
weak showing of intent may be found sufficient based on a strong 
showing of materiality, and vice versa.”85 Finally, Chief Judge 
Rader’s opinion for the court further clarified what is needed to 
prove specific intent by circumstantial evidence. The court 
reiterated the “single most reasonable inference” requirement 
implicit in any burden of proof requiring at least a preponderance 
of evidence86
                                                                                                         
adjustment.”). 
 and previously articulated by a Federal Circuit panel 
82 The quotation marks around “active” reflect the fact that the Federal 
Circuit has a number of senior judges who are active in a less technical sense of 
the term in that they sit regularly on three-judge panels, helping to decide cases 
and to write opinions supporting the court’s decisions. 
83 Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290; id. at 1296-97 (O’Malley, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (indicating that she concurred with the majority on 
everything but the proper approach for “assessing materiality”); id. at 1302 
(Bryson, J., dissenting) (observing that disagreement on the proper standard for 
materiality “is what divides the court in this case”). 
84 Abbott Labs. v. TorPharm, Inc., 300 F.3d 1367, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(“While the intent to deceive may be inferred from the surrounding 
circumstances rather than by direct evidence, the intent necessary to establish 
inequitable conduct is based on a sliding scale related to materiality of the 
omission.”), overruled in part, Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1276; Critikon, Inc. v. 
Becton Dickinson Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1256 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
(“The more material the omission or the misrepresentation, the lower the level 
of intent required to establish inequitable conduct, and vice versa.”), overruled 
in part, Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1276. 
85 Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1290; id. at 1296-97 (O’Malley, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (indicating that she concurred with the majority on 
everything but the proper approach for “assessing materiality”); id. at 1302 
(Bryson, J., dissenting) (observing that disagreement on the proper standard for 
materiality “is what divides the court in this case”). 
86 Id. at 1290. The “single most reasonable inference” standard is implicit in 
burdens of proof requiring at least a preponderance of the evidence because, if 
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in Star Scientific.87 The court added that “[t]he absence of a good 
faith explanation for withholding a material reference does not, by 
itself, prove intent to deceive.”88
In contrast to the Federal Circuit judges’ basic unanimity on 
the proper approach to assessing intent, the eleven judges sharply 
split on the question of the proper standard for materiality.
 
89 A 
bare majority of six coalesced behind a new framework for 
assessing materiality.90 The majority pointed to policy concerns to 
justify this “judicial reform,”91 explaining that prior efforts to 
restrict inequitable conduct charges through a “higher intent 
standard” alone “did not reduce the number of inequitable conduct 
cases before the courts and did not cure the problem of 
overdisclosure of marginally relevant prior art to the PTO.”92
The majority’s answer to these continuing concerns was 
adoption of a general rule that “the materiality required to establish 
inequitable conduct is but-for materiality.”
 
93
                                                                                                         
the facts support a more probable or even just equally probable inference of a 
mental state more innocent than “specific intent to deceive,” then the existence 
of such specific intent is necessarily no more than fifty percent likely, a ceiling 
on the likelihood of specific intent presumably insufficient to support a finding 
of specific intent even under a mere preponderance-of-the-evidence standard. 
 In other words, 
alleged misconduct, such as nondisclosure of a prior-art reference, 
would, generally speaking, only be considered material for 
purposes of an inequitable conduct defense if the USPTO “would 
not have allowed a claim” in the issued patent if the misconduct 
87 Supra text accompanying notes 38-39. 
88 Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1291. 
89 See id. at 1296 (O’Malley, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(reporting “respectfu[l] dissent” from the majority’s holdings on materiality); id. 
at 1302 (Bryson, J., dissenting) (contending that the majority’s approach “marks 
a significant and . . . unwise departure from [Federal Circuit] precedents”). 
90 See id. at 1291 (majority opinion) (“[T]his court adjusts as well the 
standard for materiality.”). 
91 Arti K. Rai, Building a Better Innovation System: Combining Facially 
Neutral Patent Standards with Therapeutics Regulation, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 1037, 
1038 (2008) (noting in 2008 that, while “legislative reform ha[d] been 
thwarted,” “judicial reform” had proceeded). 
92 Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1291. 
93 Id. 
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had not occurred.94
Significantly, however, the majority did not stop with 
articulation of the new general requirement of but-for materiality. 
The majority qualified the general rule with an explicit exception. 
Specifically, the majority stated that “affirmative acts of egregious 
misconduct” are effectively material per se.
 
95 The majority 
emphasized that the purpose of this exceptional category was to 
give the new overall test for materiality “sufficient flexibility to 
capture extraordinary circumstances.”96 Consistent with this aim, 
the majority declined to provide a complete definition of the 
category of “affirmative egregious acts.”97 Instead, the majority 
gave an illustrative example of such an act—namely, “the filing of 





Is the Federal Circuit’s newly formulated approach to assessing 
inequitable conduct claims a good one? Of course, it is an 
empirical question whether that approach will succeed in 
substantially restraining a “plague” of inequitable conduct charges 
while maintaining a robust penalty that helps deter misconduct in 
dealings with the USPTO. For this empirical question, there is no 
                                                                                                         
94 Id. The test for but-for materiality is apparently an objective one, not a 
subjective test tied to the individual idiosyncrasies of an actual, single examiner. 
The question appears to be whether a properly acting USPTO examiner, 
“giv[ing] claims their broadest reasonable construction” and “apply[ing] the 
preponderance of the evidence standard” for rejecting claims, would have 
allowed the claim to issue. Id. at 1291-92. Consistent with this objective 
understanding of materiality, the majority indicated that, because district courts 
use the best rather than the broadest reasonable construction for claims, and 
because invalidity of a patent claim must be proven by clear and convincing 
evidence in district courts, rather than a mere preponderance of the evidence, “if 
a claim is properly invalidated in district court based on the deliberately 
withheld reference, then that reference is necessarily material.” Id. at 1292. 
95 Id. at 1292. 
96 Id. at 1293. 
97 Id. 
98 Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1293. 
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quick and easy answer.99
In the meantime, the new approach to assessing inequitable 
conduct outlined by Therasense appears at least to represent a 
reasonable and even laudable effort to improve the practical 
performance of a problematic body of law. Although 
commentators frequently criticize the Federal Circuit for excessive 
formalism, the Therasense court explicitly cites real-world policy 
concerns to support the change in course that it adopts.
  
100 
Additionally, the court cites such policy concerns in an equitable 
context where consideration of policy concerns has traditionally 
been thought appropriate.101 The court’s tightening of the 
requirement of specific intent was relatively uncontroversial and, 
given concerns with uncertainty and overcompliance, quite 
defensible.102 Further, the test for materiality adopted by the court 
seeks to strike a reasonable balance between clear guidance and 
reserved flexibility by employing a doctrinal arrangement common 
in equity: a strong default rule combined with a nontrivial 
allowance for exceptions.103
                                                                                                         
99 See Petherbridge, Rantanen & Mojibi, supra note 
 The new materiality test’s somewhat 
27, at 1350 (concluding 
that “only time will tell whether the majority’s predictions [of positive effects] 
will come to pass”). 
100 See supra text accompanying notes 80-81. 
101 See, e.g., Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Statutory Violations and Equitable 
Discretion, 70 CAL. L. REV. 524, 538 (1982) (“In the field of nuisance law, 
equity invaded the common law by introducing a comparative weighing of 
public values in trespass actions.”); William Murray Tabb, Reconsidering the 
Application of Laches in Environmental Litigation, 14 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
377, 400 (1990) (“Public interest concerns traditionally have played a key role 
in affecting a court’s equitable discretion regarding entitlement and fashioning 
of equitable relief.”). 
102 See Cotropia, supra note 13, at 777 (arguing for a requirement of 
specific intent that is truly separate from that for materiality). But see McGowan, 
supra note 2, at 976 (arguing that “the court should reverse its course on 
scienter” and “return to a standard of recklessness”). 
103 See Mark Gergen, John M. Golden & Henry E. Smith, The Supreme 
Court’s Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions, 112 
COLUM. L. REV. 203, 206 (2012) (contending that, “[i]n deciding whether to 
issue injunctions, courts would generally do well by continuing to use the kinds 
of structured sets of presumptions and safety valves that have characterized 
traditional equitable practice”). 
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fuzzily defined exception for “affirmative egregious acts”104 might 
help deter at least the worst forms of abuse not captured by the 
general requirement of but-for materiality.105
In at least one respect, we know that Therasense has been an 
almost immediate success. Within two months of the court’s 
decision, the USPTO, which had opposed a but-for materiality test 
in the en banc proceedings,
 
106 reversed course and proposed “to 
revise [its] materiality standard . . . to match the materiality 
standard, as defined in Therasense.”107
Moreover, Congress has taken its own route to endorsing 
something like a but-for materiality test. The Leahy-Smith 
America Invents Act that became law in September 2011 provides 
for a process of “supplemental examination” by which a patentee 
can effectively inoculate a patent against charges of inequitable 
conduct by resubmitting the patent for reexamination based on 
corrected information.
 The USPTO’s course 
change helps eliminate awkward incongruity between the 
USPTO’s definition of an applicant’s duty to disclose and the 
Federal Circuit’s definition of what constitutes inequitable 
conduct, and elimination of this incongruity has probably made 
intervention by the U.S. Supreme Court less likely.  
108
                                                                                                         
104 As Judge Bryson’s dissent points out, “it is often difficult to draw a line 
between nondisclosure and affirmative misrepresentation,” “not to mention . . . 
between ‘egregious’ misconduct and misconduct that is assertedly less than 
‘egregious.’” Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1313 n.3 (Bryson, J., dissenting). 
 Under the Therasense rubric, successful 
105 See Gergen, Golden & Smith, supra note 103, at 237-38 (“It is 
foundational that equity must be open textured in light of the ability of parties to 
opportunistically evade legal obligations.”). 
106 Therasense, 649 F.3d at 1305 (Bryson, J., dissenting) (describing the 
USPTO as “persuasively argu[ing] in its amicus brief [that] the ‘but for’ 
standard for materiality is too restrictive”). 
107 U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Revision of the Materiality to 
Patentability Standard for the Duty to Disclose Information in Patent 
Applications, 76 Fed. Reg. 43631, 43631 (proposed July 21, 2011). 
108 See Jason Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge, Toward a System of Invention 
Registration: The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, 110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST 
IMPRESSIONS 24, 25 (2011) (describing the “supplemental examination” 
provision as “a patent amnesty program”). The act expressly provides that “[a] 
patent shall not be held unenforceable on the basis of conduct relating to 
information that had not been considered, was inadequately considered, or was 
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passage of a patent through such a supplemental examination 
might be viewed as effectively establishing that corrected errors in 
disclosure were not but-for material and thus not proper grounds 
for a holding of unenforceability due to inequitable conduct. 
With such USPTO and congressional actions appearing 
effectively to bolster aspects of the Therasense approach, the 
Federal Circuit’s new approach to determining whether there is 
inequitable conduct—including its relatively uncontroversial 
tightening of the specific intent requirement and its more 
controversial tightening of the materiality requirement—appears 
relatively secure. Will the Federal Circuit’s Therasense 
prescription suffice to correct or, at least, substantially mitigate the 
inequitable conduct defense’s faults? There seems at least a decent 
chance that it will. But patent law’s Falstaff—the inequitable 
conduct defense—has proven irrepressible in the past. We will 
have to wait and see the outcome of the Federal Circuit’s latest 
admonition that this Falstaff should “[m]ake less thy body . . . and 
more thy grace.”109
                                                                                                         
incorrect in a prior examination of the patent if the information was considered, 
reconsidered, or corrected during a supplemental examination of the patent.” 
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. 112-29, § 12(a), 125 Stat. 284, 326 
(2011) (to be codified at 35 U.S.C. § 257(c)(1)). 
 
109 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, 2 HENRY IV 5.5, l. 50, in NORTON 
SHAKESPEARE, supra note 1, at 1374 (Henry V’s closing admonition to Falstaff).  
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